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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Robert S. ("Robert"), then a minor,filed this action 
against the Stetson School ("Stetson"), several Stetson 
employees, and others. His complaint asserted claims 
against the school and its staff members under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 for violating his federal constitutional rights by 
subjecting him to physical and psychological abuse. 2 The 
complaint also contained a variety of state-law claims 
against these defendants. In this appeal, Robert challenges 
the District Court's decision that Stetson and its staff did 
not act under color of state law, as well as two of the 




Robert was a victim of sexual abuse, and he in tur n 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also included claims against the City of Philadelphia, 
the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, and city officials. These 
claims are not before us in this appeal. 
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molested his younger brother. In 1993, when Robert was 
13, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found him to 
be a "dependent child,"3see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 6302, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A "dependent child" is a child who: 
 
        (1) is without proper parental car e or control, subsistence, 
       education as required by law, or other car e or control necessary 
for 
       his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A 
       determination that there is a lack of pr oper parental care or 
control 
       may be based upon evidence of conduct by the par ent, guardian or 
       other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the 
child 
       at risk, including evidence of the parent's, guardian's or other 
       custodian's use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places 
the 
       health, safety or welfare of the child at risk; 
 
        (2) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; 
 
        (3) has been abandoned by his parents, guar dian, or other 
       custodian; 
 
        (4) is without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian; 
 
        (5) while subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually 
       and without justification truant from school; 
 
        (6) has committed a specific act or acts of habitual disobedience 
       of the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian or 
       other custodian and who is ungovernable and found to be in need 
       of care, treatment or supervision; 
 
        (7) is under the age of ten years and has committed a delinquent 
       act; 
 
        (8) has been formerly adjudicated dependent, and is under the 
       jurisdiction of the court, subject to its conditions or placements 
and 
       who commits an act which is defined as ungover nable in paragraph 
       (6); 
 
        (9) has been referred pursuant to section 6323 (relating to 
       informal adjustment), and who commits an act which is defined as 
       ungovernable in paragraph (6); or 
 
        (10) is born to a parent whose par ental rights with regard to 
       another child have been involuntarily terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. 
       S 2511 (relating to grounds for involuntary termination) within 
three 
       years immediately preceding the date of birth of the child and 
       conduct of the parent poses a risk to the health, safety or welfare 
of 
       the child. 
 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6302. 
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6351, and placed him, with his mother's consent, in the 
temporary custody of the Philadelphia Department of 
Human Services ("DHS").4 At no time, however, did a court 
find Robert to be a "delinquent child," see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. SS 6302, 6352, nor was he convicted of any crime. 
 
DHS decided that Robert would be best served by 
enrolling him in Stetson, a school that specializes in the 
treatment and education of juvenile sex of fenders. This 
decision was not mandated by any court order and was 
done with the consent of Robert's mother. DHS remained 
Robert's legal custodian throughout his stay at Stetson and 
was authorized to remove him at any time if it was not fully 
satisfied with the services that Stetson was pr oviding. In 
fact, at the urging of Robert's mother , DHS eventually did 
remove Robert from Stetson in March 1997. 
 
Stetson is a private, residential institution located in 
Barre, Massachusetts. At the time of Robert's enrollment, 
Stetson had approximately 55 residential students and four 
or five commuter students. All of the Stetson students were 
sex offenders. Incorporated under Massachusetts law and 
licensed by the state, Stetson was governed by a board of 
trustees, the members of which were elected by a board of 
corporators. None of the members of the boar d of trustees 
or the board of corporators were appointed by a government 
entity, and none were federal, state, or local employees. 
 
Stetson's buildings and property were all privately owned 
and maintained, and Stetson had full control over its 
admissions process. Admissions decisions wer e made by a 
committee that reviewed applications and conducted 
interviews of interested applicants. Stetson was not 
obligated to accept any student. In fact, Stetson historically 
refused to accept students with criminal r ecords and had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6351, a court may permit a 
"dependent child" to remain with his or her parents, guardian, or other 
custodian subject to such conditions as the court pr escribes or transfer 
temporary legal custody to a private person or or ganization or "[a] 
public 
agency authorized by law to receive and pr ovide care for the child." 
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successfully gone to court to exclude students whom it did 
not believe satisfied its stringent enrollment criteria.5 
 
In pursuing its mission of providing tr eatment and 
education to juvenile sex offenders, Stetson worked in close 
concert with state and local governments. For example, 
Stetson and the City of Philadelphia entered into various 
financial and performance contracts r egarding Philadelphia 
children placed in the school. These contracts were entered 
into pursuant to the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services 
Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6301 et seq. According to the 
testimony of Richard Robertson, Stetson's Executive 
Director, the City of Philadelphia paid Stetson slightly more 
than $200 per day for each student, an amount that was 
insufficient to cover the school's actual costs. Costs not 
covered by tuition were covered by grants from private 
foundations, other charitable contributions, and loans. 
Neither DHS nor the City of Philadelphia had any 
involvement in the day-to-day management of Stetson. That 
task was left entirely to the Stetson staf f. 
 
Stetson provided a structured envir onment for its 
students. Students were not permitted to leave campus 
without supervision, were assigned bed times, were 
generally awakened at approximately the same time, and 
ate their meals at times set by the staff. Although the 
school did not require uniforms, it had a dress code.6 
Students were allowed to use both computers and 
telephones, but when students used a telephone, a Stetson 
staff member was normally in the r oom for therapeutic 
reasons.7 Students wer e allowed to write and receive mail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. According to the testimony of Richar d Robertson, the Executive 
Director of Stetson, on one occasion a court attempted to issue an order 
placing a child at Stetson. The school objected and ultimately prevailed 
in its effort to keep the student out of Stetson. 
6. Richard Robinson testified, "W e don't allow T-shirts with marijuana 
symbols on them, we don't allow Grateful Dead T -shirts, we don't allow 
symbols and things that are sexualized in natur e; we don't allow tank 
tops and short-shorts in the dining room for health code reasons." 
 
7. Richard Robinson testified that a Stetson staff member is normally in 
the room with students, but not actually on the phone. According to 
Robinson, "Sometimes children can get very upset when they're talking 
to parents or relatives or whoever they'r e talking to on the phone, we've 
had children who have smashed windows and attacked staff." Appendix 
at 186B. 
 
                                5 
  
Some were also allowed to leave campus with supervision 
and to go home for vacations. Stetson did not employ any 
mechanical or chemical restraints; the buildings did not 
have bars on the windows; and the school did not per mit 
corporal or physical punishment. 
 
Robert alleged that Stetson staff members subjected him 
to physical and psychological abuse, including wr estling 
with him and kicking and punching him. Robert claimed 
that this conduct violated Stetson's policy against  
"horseplay"8 and sever ely disrupted his treatment. He 
reported this alleged abuse to a Stetson therapist in 
February 1997. After an internal investigation, Stetson 
concluded that three of its counselors had violated the anti- 
horseplay policy and subsequently suspended them. The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts also investigated and 
decided that Stetson had acted appropriately in punishing 
the counselors. 
 
Not satisfied with the school's response, Robert filed this 
action, asserting claims under S 1983 for violations of his 
constitutional rights, as well as state-law claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and 
battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of 
privacy, negligence, and state-law civil rights violations. On 
motion of the Stetson defendants, the District Court 
bifurcated the trial. After hearing evidence on the question 
of state action, the Court made findings of fact r elated to 
that question and held that the Stetson defendants were 
not state actors. A trial was then held on Robert's state-law 
claims, but the jury did not award him any r elief, and 
Robert took this appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The anti-horseplay policy was included in the employee manual as 
part of a list of unacceptable behaviors. The policy provides: 
 
       "Horseplay" or "roughhousing" is physical playing or teasing that 
       has the real potential to lead to injury or afight between students 
       or between students and staff. If a staf f identifies the play 
between 
       students as "horseplay" or "roughhousing", the student must stop 
       that kind of play or interacting. Too often"horseplay" or 
       "roughhousing" leads to dangerous play or fighting. 
 




Embodying the state-action requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 934-35 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), 42 U.S.C. S 1983 pr ovides a 
cause of action that may be asserted against "[e]very person 
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage . . . of any state . . . subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution . . . " (emphasis added). Thus, a 
plaintiff in a section 1983 action bears the threshold 
burden of proving that "the alleged deprivation was 
committed by a person acting under color of state law." 
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F .3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Moore v. Tartle, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
 
As noted, the Stetson School is a private institution, and 
thus the school and its employees do not for mally wield the 
authority of the state. There are, however , some 
circumstances in which "seemingly private behavior `may 
fairly be treated as that of the State itself.' " Brentwood 
Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch., 121 S.Ct. 924, 930 
(2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345, 349 (1974)). The Supreme Court r ecently wrote 
that there are "a host of facts that can bear on the fairness 
of such an attribution" and that "[a]midst such variety, 
examples may be the best teachers." Id. W e therefore begin 
our analysis of the state-action question in this case with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830 (1982), which provides the example that is most 
closely analogous to the present case. 
 
Rendell-Baker concerned the New Perspectives School, an 
institution with many similarities to the Stetson School. 
The New Perspectives School was a nonprofit institution 
that specialized in treating and educating students who had 
experienced difficulty completing public high schools 
(largely due to drug, alcohol, and behavioral problems). New 
Perspectives was a private school, located on private 
property, and operated by a private boar d of directors. 
Students who attended New Perspectives were generally 
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referred by local school committees or the state department 
of health. The school committees paid New Perspectives for 
its services, and at least 90% of New Perspectives' operating 
budget came from public funds. To be eligible for this 
funding, New Perspectives was required to comply with 
various local and state regulations. The school also entered 
into contracts with governmental bodies that r eferred 
students to the school. 
 
Applying the factors discussed in Blum v. Y aretsky, 457 
U.S. 991 (1982), a case handed down on the same day as 
Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court held that New 
Perspectives' discharge of employees was not state action. 
First, the Court rejected the argument that the school was 
a state actor because "virtually all of [its] income was 
derived from government funding." Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 
at 840. The Court stated that "[a]cts of . . . private 
contractors do not become acts of the government by 
reason of their significant or even total engagement in 
performing public contracts." Id . at 841. The Court likewise 
found no merit in the argument that extensive state 
regulation of the school was sufficient to make it a state 
actor, because the challenged conduct by New Perspectives 
"was not compelled or even influenced by any state 
regulation." Id. Next, the Court concluded that New 
Perspectives was not performing a function that had been 
" `traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' " Id. at 
842 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added in 
Rendell-Baker)). The Court recognized that"the education of 
maladjusted high school students is a public function" and 
that state law required that services be provided for these 
students at public expense. 457 U.S. at 842; see also id. at 
845 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But the Court noted that 
"until recently the State had not undertaken to provide 
education for students who could not be served by the 
traditional public schools," and the Court commented: 
"That a private entity performs a function which serves the 
public does not make its acts state action." Id. Finally, the 
Court rejected the argument that ther e was a "symbiotic 
relationship" between New Perspectives and the state 
sufficient to make New Perspectives a state actor . The Court 
observed that "[t]he school's fiscal r elationship with the 
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State [was] not different fr om that of many contractors 
performing services for the gover nment." Id. 
 
In light of Rendell-Baker, it is appar ent that many of the 
factors upon which Robert relies here ar e insufficient to 
establish state action. For example, it is clear that Stetson's 
receipt of government funds did not make it a state actor. 
Similarly, although Robert relies on the detailed 
requirements set out in DHS's contracts with Stetson, those 
requirements are also insufficient because they did not 
"compel or even influence" the conduct on the part of the 
Stetson staff that Robert challenged. See American Mfrs. 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) ("mere 
fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not 
by itself convert its action into that of the State"); Black, 
985 F.2d at 710-11 (pervasive regulation"made no 
difference" because the complained of conduct was "not 
compelled or even influenced by any state r egulation"). 
 
Robert argues, however, that the Stetson School, unlike 
the New Perspectives School, performed a function that has 
traditionally been the exclusive province of the state. 
Indeed, Robert's brief forswears reliance on any other 
theory of state action. See Appellant's Br . at 30 ("Only the 
Public Function Test is useful and relevant in reviewing the 
state actorship determination by the District Court in the 
present matter on appeal."). As we have noted, this test 
imposes a "rigorous standard" that is "rarely . . . satisfied," 
Mark, 51 F.3d at 1142, for "[w]hile many functions have 
been traditionally performed by gover nments, very few have 
been `exclusively reserved to the State.' " Flagg Brothers Inc. 
v. Lefkowitz, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). 
 
In this case, Robert has not made the requisite showing. 
As was true of the New Perspectives School in Rendell- 
Baker, the record here does not show that the Stetson 
School performed a function that has been traditionally the 
exclusive province of the state. In fact, the undisputed 
evidence showed that the only schools that of fered services 
similar to those provided by Stetson wer e private schools. 
See Appendix at 149B (testimony of Richar d Robinson 
indicating that he is unaware of any public schools that 
specialize in educating and treating sex of fenders). The 
mere fact that Stetson "perfor ms a function which serves 
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the public does not makes its acts state action." Rendell- 
Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. 
 
This conclusion is supported by our decision in Black by 
Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F .2d 707 (3d Cir. 
1993), a case involving a private bus company with which 
a school district had contracted to transport students to 
and from school. We found that case to be indistinguishable 
from Rendell-Baker, concluding that 
 
       [w]hile [the company and the individual defendants 
       affiliated with it] were carrying out a state program at 
       state expense, they were not perfor ming a function that 
       has been "traditionally the exclusive prer ogative of the 
       state" and there was no state regulation that 
       "compelled or even influenced" the conduct which is 
       alleged to have violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
 
Black by Black, 985 F.2d at 710-11. W e went on to state 
that "as in Rendell-Baker, the cooperation between the 
[state and the contractor] was only that appr opriate to the 
execution of the subject matter of the contract and the 
contractor's `fiscal relationship with the State is not 
different from that of many contractors performing services 
for the state.' " Id. at 711 (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 
at 843). Finally, although school busing is commonly 
thought of as a traditional state function, we concluded 
that the "state contractor was not providing a service within 
the exclusive province of the state." Id. We believe that the 
facts of the present case warrant the same conclusion. 
 
Robert appears to suggest that this case is dif ferent 
because the services that Stetson provided wer e services 
that DHS was required by state law to pr ovide. See 
Appellant's Br. at 21, 24, 46. This very ar gument, however, 
appears to have been rejected in Rendell-Baker. In dissent 
in that case, Justice Marshall highlighted the fact that the 
New Perspectives School "provide[d] a service that the State 
[was] required to provide" under a state statute enacted a 
few years earlier, 457 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 845, but the Court was not persuaded. See 
457 U.S. at 842 ("That legislative policy choice in no way 
makes these services the exclusive province of the State."). 
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Stressing the restrictions placed on students' liberty 
while attending the Stetson School, Robert ar gues that "the 
involuntary nature of [his] commitment" made his situation 
there "entirely analogous to the situation of either a 
prisoner or mentally committed individual held against 
his/her will." Appellant's Br. at 44. Ther e is, however, no 
factual basis for analogizing Robert's situation at the 
Stetson School to that of a prisoner or a person who has 
been involuntarily civilly committed. Whether or not Robert, 
a minor at the time in question, personally wanted to 
attend the Stetson School, his legal custodian, DHS, 
wanted him placed there, and his mother consented. Thus, 
his enrollment at Stetson was not "involuntary" in the 
sense relevant here, i.e., he was not deprived of his liberty 
in contravention of his legal custodian's (or his mother's) 
wishes.9 
 
Finally, we do not believe that the present case is 
comparable to Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 
1982), a case that Robert believes is directly on point. In 
Milonas, a class consisting of students at the Provo Canyon 
School for Boys brought section 1983 claims against the 
school and members of its staff, alleging that inhumane 
treatment at the school violated the Constitution. The Provo 
Canyon School, as described in the Tenth Cir cuit opinion, 
was an unusual facility. A private facility for boys with 
severe physical, psychological, and emotional problems, the 
school was described in the District Court opinion, which 
the Tenth Circuit quoted, as " `not a school in the 
traditional, ordinary, classroom sense.' " 691 F.2d at 935. 
Although the school did offer classes, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The power that DHS exercised over Robert is not comparable to the 
power that a state exercises over a person whose liberty is restricted as 
a result of a criminal conviction or involuntary civil commitment. The 
latter power is quintessentially governmental, but a legal guardian's 
authority over a minor is not. The Juvenile Act, on which Robert relies, 
provides that temporary custody of a dependent child such as Robert 
may be transferred, not only to an authorized"public agency" such as 
DHS, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6351(a)(2)(iii), but also to "[a]ny 
individual resident within or without [the] Commonwealth" who is found 
to be qualified or to a qualified "private organization." 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. 
ANN. S 6351(a)(2)(i) and (ii). 
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observed, the school was " `also a corr ectional and detention 
facility.' " While students were generally admitted at the 
insistence of one or both of their parents, others were 
"received at the school directly fr om juvenile courts and 
probation officers from across the nation." Id. at 936. 
Conditions at the school were unusually harsh and 
restrictive. Id. The District Court wr ote: 
 
       Students are restricted to the grounds. Students are 
       confined. Some students are locked in and locked up 
       with varying degrees of personal liberty r estored as 
       each progresses through the institutional program. If a 
       student leaves without permission, he is hunted down, 
       taken into custody and returned. . . . 
 
       Regardless of origin, condition or motivation, once 
       arrived, each person during the beginning phases of 
       the school program was locked in, isolated fr om the 
       outside world, and whether anti-social, crippled or 
       learning disabled, was subject to mandated physical 
       standing day after day after day to promote"right 
       thinking" and "social conformity." Mail was censored. 
       Visitors were discouraged. Disparaging r emarks 
       concerning the institution were pr ohibited and 
       punished. To "graduate" from confinement to a more 
       liberated phase, one had to "pass" a lie detector test 
       relating to "attitude," "truthfulness" and "future 
       conduct." Some failed to pass and remained in 
       confinement for extended periods of time. 
 
Id. at 935-36. 
 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the state "ha[d] so 
insinuated itself with the Provo Canyon School as to be 
considered a joint participant in the of fending actions." Id. 
at 940. The Court relied on the involuntary commitment of 
some students, the school's detailed contracts with the 
school districts, the school's receipt of substantial state 
funding, and extensive state regulation. See id. Recognizing 
that the New Perspectives School in Rendell-Baker was 
"indeed quite similar" to the Provo Canyon School, the 
Tenth Circuit attempted to distinguish the cases by noting 
that the plaintiffs in Rendell-Baker were employees of the 
school, whereas the plaintiffs in Milonas were students, 
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"some of whom have been involuntarily placed in the school 
by state officials who were aware of, and approved of, 
certain of the practices which the district court . . . 
enjoined." Id. at 940. 
 
Milonas is not binding on us, and we cannot agree 
entirely with the court's reasoning. The Milonas court's 
reliance on "significant state funding of tuition" and the 
detailed contracts between the school and local school 
districts appears to us to be squarely inconsistent with 
Rendell-Baker. Moreover, we ar e uncertain what the Milonas 
court had in mind when it sought to distinguish Rendell- 
Baker on the ground that the plaintif fs in that case were 
school employees, rather than students. Ther e are, of 
course, circumstances in which this distinction might 
matter. (For example, a state directive might require a 
private entity to engage in the conduct challenged by a 
student while imposing no such requirement regarding 
conduct challenged by an employee.) But it is unclear why 
the Milonas court thought that it was important that the 
plaintiffs in the case before it wer e students. It is possible 
that the Milonas court took this view because it believed 
that some state officials "were awar e of, and approved of " 
certain of the Provo Canyon School's practices concerning 
the treatment of students. It is not clear that even such 
awareness and approval would be enough to establish state 
action,10 but if this is not what the Milonas court had in 
mind, the significance of the fact that the plaintiffs were 
students is obscure. 
 
In any event, we need not decide whether we would agree 
with the Tenth Circuit on the facts pr esented in Milonas, 
because the case now before us is quite dif ferent. Here, 
Robert was not "involuntarily placed in the school by state 
officials who were aware of, and appr oved of " the practices 
attacked in Robert's complaint. Robert was enr olled at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. There is tension between Milonas's reliance on such awareness and 
approval as the basis for finding state action and the Supreme Court's 
holding in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S.O.C., 483 U.S. 522, 547 
(1987) (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-5), that governmental " `approval 
of or acquiescence in' " the challenged conduct was not enough to 
establish state action. 
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Stetson by his legal custodian and with his mother's 
consent, and we are aware of no evidence that any state 
officials were aware or approved of the conduct by the 
members of the Stetson staff that forms the basis of 
Robert's claims -- much less any evidence that they 
"provided such significant encouragement, either overt or 
covert, that the [challenged conduct] must in law be 
deemed to be that of the [state]." Blum , 457 U.S. at 1004; 
see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S.O.C. , 483 U.S. 
522, 546 (1987). 
 
Moreover, for what it is worth, ther e is simply no 
evidence that Stetson subjected its students to anything 
approaching the conditions at the Provo Canyon School. As 
far as the record here reveals, Stetson students were not 
placed in solitary confinement, discouraged fr om seeing 
visitors, required to take lie detector tests, or subjected to 
censorship of their mail. On the contrary, it is undisputed 
that Robert was allowed to leave campus with an 
instructor, had regular contact with his family (including 
frequent visits with his mother and step-father), was 
allowed to leave campus with his family, and was even 
allowed to go home for vacations. 
 
Robert emphasizes the fact that Stetson students wer e 
not allowed to leave the school grounds without permission 
and that, if they did, the school would attempt to locate 
and return them, with the help of the local police 
department if necessary. See Appellant's Br . at 38-39. He 
argues that his "complete inability to leave the Stetson 
School without having a bench warrant issued for his 
detention, effectively ma[de] him a`prisoner', much more 
analogous to an inmate, than to any other situation." Id. at 
39. In response, Stetson states: 
 
       In the event that a student were to leave campus 
       without permission, Stetson, like all r esponsible private 
       or public schools, would notify local police for the 
       student's own welfare and for the protection of the 
       community. Stetson would not issue a warrant and 
       arrest order because Stetson lacked the jurisdictional 
       basis and the legal authority on its own to invoke 
       custodial proceedings. 
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Appellees's Br. at 11 (citations to appendix omitted). 
 
Robert has not referred us to any evidence in the record 
that supports his assertion that the school did mor e than 
simply notify the police department if a student left without 
permission.11 Nor has he referred us to any provision of 
Massachusetts statute or common law that gave Stetson 
any greater authority with respect to a missing student 
than is enjoyed by any of the state's other privately owned 
and run residential schools. 
 
In sum, whether or not we would follow Milonas , we are 
satisfied that that case is easily distinguishable from the 
case before us. Particularly in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rendell-Baker, we agree with the District Court 
that Robert failed to show that the challenged actions of the 




Robert also challenges two evidentiary rulings made by 
the District Court during the trial on his state-law claims. 
First, he argues that the District Court err ed by limiting the 
expert testimony of Anne Wolbert Burgess, D.N.S., who was 
prepared to testify that the behavior to which Robert was 
subjected at Stetson constituted child abuse. The District 
Court accepted Burgess as an expert in child abuse, but 
the Court ruled that an expert opinion on the question 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Robert's brief provides two citations. The first is to the first page 
of 
the transcript of the hearing before the District Court. Apparently, by 
citing to this page, Robert intended to cite the entire hearing. His 
second 
citation is to a page of the District Court opinion stating that 
"Plaintiff 
also proved that Stetson contacts the police when a child leaves the 
premises without permission." The District Court did not make any 
reference to the issuance of a warrant, and in the next sentence, the 
Court found that, despite the "obviously significant limitations on the 
freedom of students enrolled at Stetson," it did not believe that Stetson 
was "fulfilling the traditional public function of incarcerating 
criminals." 
Id. The District Court pointed out that Robert was never adjudicated a 
criminal, the decision to place him at Stetson was made with the advice 
and support of his mother, and many of the r estrictions imposed on 
students at Stetson were no greater than those imposed at any strict 
private boarding school. See id. 
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whether specific conduct constituted child abuse would not 
be helpful to the jury under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Mor oever, 
the Court concluded that testimony by Burgess on this 
point would result in "undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence" within the 
meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 403, and the Court ther efore 
precluded such testimony. In addition, the Court ruled that 
Burgess was not qualified to "render an opinion diagnosing 
plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder" and that "such 
testimony would be unnecessarily cumulative to the 
testimony of plaintiff 's other experts." As a result of these 
rulings, Burgess's testimony was limited to the treatment 
that she believed would have been best for Robert. 
 
Robert argues that the District Court err ed in limiting 
Burgess's testimony. He claims that Bur gess's testimony 
was offered to "help explain to the jury the ramifications, 
and implications, of uninvited physical contact by staff with 
Plaintiff, in the guise of horseplay." Robert's Brief at 52. 
More specifically, he argues that expert testimony was 
necessary to explain that children "who act out sexually" 
and who have been the victims of sexual abuse "ar e at an 
increased risk for harm caused by . . . uninvited 
inappropriate physical contact." See id.  at 54. Therefore, he 
contends that the District Court made it impossible for him 
adequately to explain the seriousness of the horseplay by 
the Stetson staff. Id. at 55-56. 
 
We review a District Court's decision to admit or reject 
testimony under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion, and, we 
will not reverse such a ruling "unless it is`arbitrary and 
irrational.' " Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 
184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. DePeri, 
778 F.2d 963, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 
1217 (1991). We hold that the District Court's ruling 
limiting Burgess's testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 403 was 
within the proper bounds of its discretion. 
 
In addition to Burgess, two other experts testified on 
Robert's behalf at trial. See Stetson's Brief at 58. These two 
witnesses, Edward J. Doughtery and Robert Pr entky, both 
psychologists, testified at length about the impact that the 
alleged physical and mental abuse of Robert could have on 
someone with his history. See Appendix at 303B-309B 
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(portion of Doughtery's testimony); 739B-746B (portion of 
Prentky's testimony). Both experts explained that someone 
like Robert, who has been the victim and perpetrator of 
sexual abuse, is particularly susceptible to har m caused by 
inappropriate contact. See id. at 307B-308B (explaining 
that, prior to entering Stetson, Robert had a "brittle 
personality due to numerous problems in his early 
development" and that the conduct at Stetson"caused him 
a great deal of stress and problems"); Appendix at 744B 
("Child abuse, virtually by definition, involves some 
violation of boundaries. . . . Survivors of childhood physical 
abuse grow up with an awareness, a knowledge that their 
personal boundaries are highly permeable, so that learning 
to trust the integrity of one's own boundaries is pr ofoundly 
important. . . . When a therapist violates personal space of 
survivors, it recapitulates all of the earlier experiences that 
are boundary violations."). This testimony by Doughtery 
and Prentky addressed the same issues that Robert sought 
to address through Burgess's testimony. Therefore, the 
District Court had a reasonable basis for r egarding that 
testimony as cumulative, and the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in limiting Burgess's testimony. 
 
Robert next maintains that the District Court err ed in 
excluding certain evidence of prior bad acts by members of 
the Stetson staff. This included evidence of an incident in 
which a staff member (not one of the defendants) held a 
student over a balcony railing, evidence of an incident in 
which a staff member drove recklessly on campus with 
students in the van, evidence of the use of inappr opriate 
language by staff members, and evidence of other incidents 
that did not involve Robert or the defendants. Robert 
argues that this evidence was not offer ed to show that the 
defendants acted in conformity with it but rather to 
persuade the jury that Stetson had a permissive attitude 
regarding inappropriate behavior dir ected at students by 
staff. See Appellant's Br. at 60-61. The District Court 
excluded the evidence of the reckless driving incident, the 
incident in which a staff member held a student over a 
railing, and any other prior incidents that did not involve 
the plaintiff. See Appendix at 23. However, the Court 
allowed evidence of the use of inappropriate language by 
any of the defendants. See id. 
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Because of the distinct possibility that the jury likely 
would have considered the excluded evidence for precisely 
the purpose that Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) prohibits, i.e., to 
show that the defendants acted in conformity with these 
prior bad acts on the occasions alleged by Robert, the 
District Court had a reasonable basis for ruling that 
admission of this evidence created a danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendants under Fed. R. Evid. 403. In 
addition, since the prior acts did not involve any of the 
individual defendants or Robert and did not occur during 
the same time period as Robert's claimed abuse, 12 the 
District Court had a reasonable basis for concluding that 
the probative value of the evidence was not gr eat and for 




For the reasons discussed above, we affir m the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The balcony incident occurred befor e Robert came to Stetson and the 
reckless driving incident occurred prior to the time when Robert claims 
that his abuse began. 
                                18 
